# Case

at: long time

**Tech ready now – first ones = based on current light water reactors**

**Takes less than two years**

**Adams 11** (Rod Adams, Former Nuclear Submarine Engineer Officer and Founder of Adams Atomic Engines, Inc., “Smaller nuclear reactors allow decentralized power – some critics not pleased,” http://atomicinsights.com/2011/07/smaller-nuclear-reactors-allow-decentralized-power-some-critics-not-pleased.html)

These days, the US is building small modular reactors in just 3-4 years – in factory settings and in a confined space. There was a time when we could decide to fund and build packaged reactors for installation in remote places like Greenland or Antarctica and have the plant up and running in its designated place in less than two years. It is physically possible, though today’s regulatory environment makes it far more challenging to demonstrate that reality.

at: no expertise

**Nuclear expertise fine now**

**King et al. 11** (Marcus King, Associate Director of Research at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, with a concurrent appointment as Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, former Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team at the Center for Naval Analyses; LaVar Huntzinger, Center for Naval Analyses, author of Market Analysis with Rational Expectations, Theory, and Estimation and other books; Thoi Nguyen, research staff at Center for Naval Analyses, March 2011, “Nuclear Power on Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf)

Companies have also indicated interest in licensing new uranium recovery sites, and two applications for uranium enrichment plants are under review. The NRC is also currently reviewing 16 applications for power uprates to increase plant capacity at existing nuclear plants [21]. Operating performance has significantly improved with nuclear plants in the U.S. now operating at more than 90 percent capacity; in 1980, they operated at 56 percent capacity. 3

U.S. based nuclear technology vendors have begun to develop new products and position themselves for greater demand at home and abroad. For example, Westinghouse and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries formed a consortium to design the advanced AP 1000 reactor. Several AP 1000 reactors are under construction in China and one is planned for construction in the United States. Plans for smaller reactors have been developed and are being promoted [22]. The base of nuclear experts is expanding. Colleges and universities in the United States are graduating more nuclear engineering majors [23].

Military solves – already have experts, can train more

**Causbie 12** (Hanson Causbie, BS in Civil Engineering & BA in Comparative Politics – US Military Academy at West Point, aviation officer in the Army, March 2012, “DEPLOYABLE NUKES: THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENT”)

The need for extra training is another added cost of nuclear power. Even though Gen4 Energy includes operator training, licensing support, and technical support with the installation of their units contractors must be hired or Army personnel must be retrained in order to install the modules as well as to address any maintenance or safety issues with the plants.45 It is quite possible, however, that training for Army personnel could be provided by other branches. The Navy, for example could provide the training or even the personnel for the sustainment of nuclear facilities.

# 2ac – courts cp

**Purely legal changes cause regulatory uncertainty – destroy nuclear industry**

**CALLER 2011** (Corpus Christi Caller newspaper, “Regulatory Uncertainty Hampers Domestic Nuclear Production,” September 17, http://www.caller.com/news/2011/sep/17/regulatory-uncertainty-hampers-domestic-nuclear/)

In a letter dated Aug. 23, commission Executive Director Mark Vickery told EPA Region 6 Water Quality Director Miguel Flores the agency flouted its own laws, ignored legal precedence and violated its commitment to the state to maintain consistent rules.

"Even if the TCEQ were to attempt to provide the requested modeling, TCEQ fears that it will lead to a never-ending process as EPA further refines or modified what is sought," Vickery wrote.

Flores offered to meet with the commission to discuss the regulations. The commission declined the meeting.

"A meeting to discuss modeling is unnecessary," Jablonski said. "It takes us down a path we do not need to go."

She said the TCEQ remains open to meeting to discuss changes in regulations — a required step under a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies — but not to discuss hypothetical situations.

The EPA is reviewing the application for the aquifer exemption and will take final action after proper review, spokesman Joseph Hubbard said.

"There are long-term implications in granting an aquifer exemption," he said. "Therefore EPA must be fully assured that all information to make a decision is made available by the applicant."

Hubbard said the agency will do everything required by the Safe Drinking Water Act to protect sources of drinking water.

The tiff is a small part of the state's ongoing rift with the federal environmental regulators over air quality standards, clean energy initiatives and water purity.

Now millions of dollars into the process, Uranium Energy Corp. continues waiting, along with its investors, for some relief from the regulatory uncertainty.

Welch said federal regulators are attempting to achieve through regulation and hypothetical scenarios what they cannot achieve through legislation.

"We aren't asking for favors, we are asking for predictability," he said.

Jablonski said she understands the frustration.

"It's hard not to," she said. "The hurdles they have to clear to do business are a moving target."

**What industry on the planet can survive** a minimum five-year entrance test?"

2AC Space Lasers

Lots of alt causes

Costs too much

Theresa Hitchens 7/21/03 (Vice President and director of the Space Security Project at the Center for Defense Information, PROLIFERATION BRIEF, VOLUME 6, NUMBER 13, Carnegie Endowment for National Peace, Global Think Tank)

But here's the rub: The physicists themselves admit that the system described above is based on assumptions that are optimistic enough to border on unrealistic. Under more realistic technical parameters, a system to defend the continental United States against a North Korean launch would involve 3,600 orbiting interceptors, at a cost of either $99 billion, or using the lower launch cost figure, $49.5 billion. However, the study itself notes that even these "more realistic" assumptions are quite optimistic, not only in pushing the edge of what is technically feasible but also in that the space-based system described is one in which every element works perfectly 100 percent of the time --something unheard of in the annuals of U.S. weapons development. There is more bad news. To cover Alaska, more than double the number of interceptors would be required to defend against a North Korean ICBM, thus more than doubling the cost (more than $198 billion or more than $99 billion). To defend against a single shot from Iran (another of the countries labeled by U.S. President George W. Bush as part of the axis of evil, and a country with a ballistic missile program), the study found, is more difficult and would require more interceptors. The study found under its more realistic scenario, that 5,700 interceptors would be required, weighing 7,000 metric tons, equaling a launch cost of $154 billion (or $77 billion). Some might say that such price-tags are not out of line for a future strategic system, given what the United States has spent on its nuclear arsenal. That may be so. But remember, these figures involve only the direct cost of launching the space-based interceptors. Such interceptors, which according to the study must be much faster and much larger than any to date, would have to be developed and built. More cost. In addition, a complex computerized system to control the interceptors would have to be developed. Yet more cost. Finally, a sophisticated new system of detecting, tracking and targeting ICBM launches and nearly instantaneously providing that data to the orbiting interceptors, would be required. Substantially more cost. Even more troubling is the fact that the study's more realistic scenarios include assumptions that are forgiving in the extreme. For example, these scenarios include only 30 seconds of time for a decision to fire - the best-case analysis assumed an automatic shot once a potential target was detected. This is highly problematic, in that it is impossible to tell during the early boost-phase whether what just went up was an ICBM or a space-launch vehicle carrying a satellite (or, in the case of China, possibly astronauts). To put it mildly, it seems unlikely that any U.S. commander in chief would be comfortable with automating such a momentous decision. Furthermore, as noted above, these scenarios all are based on essentially a one-shot (in some cases, two-shots), one-kill architecture. This means there is no margin for error; no redundancy in the system. If North Korea decided to launch two ICBMs (once they get them) at Alaska from nearby launch sites, the U.S. networks postulated by the study would most likely be useless. To be able to target multiple interceptors at each incoming ICBM, however, not only involves even more astronomical costs, but also raises the technical problem of ensuring that the interceptors don't **become confused and mistake another of their fellow interceptors for the target**. The APS study, in its generosity, called space-based missile defense "impractical." A more realistic look at the data shows that it is wildly so.

**public and material disincentives**

**Krepon, Hitchens and Katz-Hyman, ’11** [Michael Krepon = Director of the Space Security Project @ Stimson Center & President/CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Theresa Hitchens is Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information, Michael Katz-Hyman is research associate for the Space Security. Project of the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Chapter 20: Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of U.S. Spacepower”, Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf>]

We argue that realizing the benefits of spacepower requires acknowledgment of four related and unavoidable dilemmas. First, the satellites upon which spacepower depends are extremely vulnerable. To be sure, advanced spacefaring nations can take various steps to reduce satellite vulnerability, but the limits of protection will surely pale beside available means of disruption and destruction, especially in low Earth orbit (LEO). Vulnerabilities can be mitigated, but not eliminated. Second, the dilemma of the profound vulnerability of essential satellites has been reinforced by another dilemma of the space age: satellites have been linked with the nuclear forces of major powers. Nuclear deterrence has long depended on satellites that provide early warning, communications, and targeting information to national command authorities. Even nuclear powers that do not rely on satellites for ballistic missile warning may still rely on them for communications, forecasting, and targeting. To interfere with the satellites of major powers has meant—and continues to mean—the possible use of nuclear weapons, since major powers could view attacks on satellites as precursors to attacks on their nuclear forces. The third dilemma of spacepower is that space disruption is far more achievable than space control. A strong offense might constitute the best defense on the ground, in the air, and at sea, but this principle holds little promise in space since a strong offense in this domain could still be negated by asymmetric means. Space control requires exquisitely correct, timely, and publicly compelling intelligence; the readiness to initiate war and to prevent another nation from shooting back; as well as the ability to dictate the choice of strategy and tactics in space. It takes great hubris to believe that even the world's sole superpower would be able to fulfill the requirements of space control when a $1 bag of marbles, properly inserted into LEO, could destroy a $1 billion satellite. The ability of the United States to dictate military strategy and tactics in asymmetric, gravity-bound warfare has proven to be challenging; it is likely to be even more challenging in space, where there is less margin for error. The fourth overarching dilemma relating to spacepower therefore rests on the realization that hard military power does not ensure space control, particularly if other nations make unwise choices and if these choices are then emulated by others. The United States has unparalleled agenda-setting powers, but Washington does not have the power to dictate or control the choices of other nations. These dilemmas are widely, but not universally, recognized. Together with the widespread public antipathy to elevating humankind's worst practices into space, they help explain why the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated space weapons have not become commonplace. These capabilities are certainly not difficult to acquire, as they are decades old. Indeed, tests of dedicated ASAT weapons have periodically occurred, and such systems were deployed for short periods during the Cold War. If the weaponization of space were inevitable, it surely would have occurred when the United States and the Soviet Union went to extraordinary lengths to compete in so many other realms. The weaponization of space has not occurred to date and is not inevitable in the future because of strong public resistence to the idea of weapons in space, and because most national leaders have long recognized that this would open a Pandora's box that would be difficult to close. Much has changed since the end of the Cold War, but the fundamental dilemmas of space control, including the linkage of satellites to nuclear deterrence among major powers, have not changed. The increased post– Cold War U.S. dependence on satellites makes the introduction of dedicated space weapons even more hazardous for national and economic security. Advocates of muscular space control must therefore take refuge in the fallacy of the last move, since warfighting plans in space make sense only in the absence of successful countermoves. Offensive counterforce operations in space do not come to grips with the dilemmas of spacepower, since proposed remedies are far more likely to accentuate than reduce satellite vulnerability. This analysis leads inexorably to a deeply unsatisfactory and yet inescapable conclusion: Realizing the enormous benefits of spacepower depends on recognizing the limits of power. The United States now enjoys unparalleled benefits from the use of space to advance national and economic security. These benefits would be placed at risk if essential zones in space become unusable as a result of warfare. Spacepower depends on the preservation and growth of U.S. capabilities in space. Paradoxically, the preservation and growth of U.S. spacepower will be undercut by the use of force in space. Because the use of weapons in or from space can lead to the loss or impairment of satellites of all major space powers, all of whom depend on satellites for military and economic security, we believe it is possible to craft a regime based on self-interest to avoid turning space into a shooting gallery. This outcome is far more difficult to achieve if major space powers engage in the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated ASAT weapons or space-to-Earth weapons. We therefore argue that it would be most unwise for the United States, as the spacepower with the most to lose from the impairment of its satellites, to initiate these steps. Similar restraint, however, needs to be exercised by other major spacefaring nations, some of which may feel that the preservation and growth of U.S. spacepower are a threat, or that it is necessary to hold U.S. space assets at risk. The United States is therefore obliged to clarify to others the risks of initiating actions harmful to U.S. satellites without prompting other spacefaring nations to take the very steps we seek to avoid. Consequently, a preservation and growth strategy for U.S. spacepower also requires a hedging strategy because, even if the United States makes prudent decisions in space, others may still make foolish choices.

**There are inherent checks**

**Mueller, 6** (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM) Note: These paragraphs are from a section addressing common misconceptions about space. Thus, the opening sentence “Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal” is a statement the author is attempting to refute.

2. Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal. This is a political matter: it’s consequently true only if people believe it • Like it or not, the norm of space sanctuary is real. The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it happens, even if we don’t know exactly what form it will take. People with engineering backgrounds in the space weapons community have a tendency, I think, to say, “Space is already so weaponized and so militarized because we use GPS for the guidance of many of our weapons, or because in the 1980s there were anti-satellite systems, or because ICBMs cross space on their way to targets, that we have al-ready crossed the weaponization frontier. Stop talking to me about it.” I would liken them to the people who on December 31, 1999 were running around saying, “We shouldn’t have these big parties tonight! The millennium doesn’t start for another year; it starts in 2001, not 2000.” That may be technically correct, but it is totally irrelevant because this is about what the public believes. The party is tonight and you can go or not, it’s up to you. There is a norm of space sanctuary that exists and that is largely because of the behavior of the United States over the last forty or fifty years. The United States could take steps to convince people that the millennium was actually in 2001 instead of 2000 or convince people that it already had weaponized space or convince people that GPS is a weapons system. However, there are a number of reasons why we haven’t done that to this point and why we might not want to do that in the future. I don’t want to suggest that because everybody thinks it is so means that it is immutably the case, but for the time being, space weaponization would be a big deal. So it is something that needs to be ad-dressed in political terms as well as technological terms

**Nobody wants to be the first to weaponize space**

**Krepon, ‘8** – Michael Krepon is President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center ( "China's Military Space Stategy: An Exchange -- "Opening Pandora's Box"." Survival. Vol. 50, No.1 (Feburary-March 2008): 157-198. http://spacedebate.org/argument/3350)

US military guidance calling for space superiority does not foreclose hit-to-kill ASATs, but the Pentagon prefers to use temporary and reversible effects in space warfare. But once this Pandora’s Box is opened, and the first satellite in military history is attacked in combat, not everyone may choose to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules. Asymmetric warfare applies in space, no less than on the ground. Because every spacefaring nation can lose badly in the event that vulnerable and essential satellites are damaged or destroyed, a rudimentary form of deterrence against satellite warfare existed during the Cold War. It continues to exist today. Deterrence of satellite warfare was far simpler and less expensive than nuclear deterrence because so much latent capability existed to harm satellites. Dedicated ASAT tests weren’t needed; they were kept to a minimum because they were provocative and dangerous.

2AC Politics – Immigration Northwestern

**House GOP are going to kill immigration reform**

**Sargent 2-4** (Geg, "How House Republicans can kill immigration," Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/02/04/how-house-republicans-can-kill-immigration-reform/)

The papers are filled with hints that a bipartisan group of House members is putting together its own immigration reform plan, which is a big deal, since it means bipartisan groups are moving forward on reform in both chambers.¶ **But there’s still one thing we don’t know about the talks in the House, which are shrouded in more secrecy** than the Manhattan Project. Specifically: Does their emerging framework even include a path to citizenship, as the Senate framework does?¶ That’s the key thing to be looking for tomorrow, when the House Judiciary Committee holds its first full hearing on the issue, and it goes directly to the possibility that the House GOP could **still** kill immigration **reform**. Check out this quote about tomorrow’s hearing from House Judiciary chairman Bob Goodlatte:¶ “I am confident that we will pass legislation dealing with immigration, but I don’t know the extent of what we can do yet, because the members need to be educated, the issues need to be discussed, and a lot of questions need to be answered about where on a spectrum between deportation and citizenship we can find common ground to bring people who are living in the shadows out of the shadows.”¶ This is less than confidence inspiring. Note that Goodlatte (who is not part of the bipartisan group working on this) doesn’t say whether he even expects citizenship to be part of the proposal; he suggests it will be somewhere on a spectrum between deportation and citizenship.¶ Hopefully, Goodlatte is wrong. **Right now, in the Senate, Dems and Republicans agree that any final immigration compromise must have two components: More border security, and a path to citizenship. Even Marco Rubio agrees with the latter; the only debate is over the relationship between enforcement and a path to citizenship, not over whether both are in the final compromise. Without both of those, the prospects for immigration reform collapse.** Dems won’t accept anything that lacks a **clear** path to citizenship **with reasonable conditions.¶ And so** one way **House** Republicans **could** deal **any prospects for reform** a serious blow is not to agree to a path to citizenship **in the bipartisan House compromise being negotiated. Another way they could do this is to insist that the path to citizenship be contingent on the Southwestern border security commission** (which is in the Senate proposal) **signing off on border security.** Dems are wary of any **such** demand**, since it would give veto power over the proposal to the likes of Jan Brewer**. And as they argue, the Obama administration has already deported a record number and has spent billions on new border enforcement. Dems are willing to agree to more enforcement, but nothing that is unreasonable or seems deliberately designed to defer the path to citizenship as long as possible.¶ The problem is that **many individual House Republicans don’t have incentives to back immigration reform,** even if opposing it is bad for the GOP **overall**. **Well over half of House Republicans represent districts that are over 80 percent white**, and over 200 of them represent districts that backed Mitt Romney (who staked out a hard right “self deportation” position). What’s more, the average GOP district is only 11.5 percent Hispanic; by contrast, the average Dem district is twice that.

**PC isn’t key – its about the status of illegal immigrants – and it will be killed by House Republicans**

**Sargent 2-5** (Greg, "The Morning Plum: Immgiration reform in jeopardy?" The Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/02/05/the-morning-plum-immigration-reform-in-jeopardy/)

Today, the GOP-controlled House Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on the bipartisan immigration reform proposal that’s being assembled by a group of House Dems and Republicans. **We don’t know what’s in this proposal, since it’s being guarded with extraordinary secrecy, but one thing is becoming quite clear**: **Unlike the Senate plan,** the House proposal won’t contain a path to citizenship**.¶ It’s another reminder of just how hostile House Republicans are to the idea**, casting doubt on the prospects for **real** reform**. GOP Rep.** Bob Goodlatte, **the chair of the House Judiciary Committee, made this as clear** as you could want in an interview:¶ Mr. Goodlatte, 60, has established a solid record of opposition to any measures he regarded as amnesty for illegal immigrants. But he said the Judiciary hearings would include scrutiny of proposals to offer legal status to most of the immigrants living illegally in the country.¶ **Calling** legalization **of those immigrants “**the most difficult side” of the **immigration** issue**, Mr. Goodlatte said the committee would consider options to give “some kind of legal status to bring people out of the shadow**s,” offering them a chance at “being a fuller part of our society.” He said the committee would examine proposals that would allow most of the 11 million illegal immigrants to become citizens relatively quickly, as well as plans that would only offer limited legal status to far fewer people.¶ So what we’re debating here is “some kind of legal status,” and a chance at “being a fuller part of our society.” **Translation: Only second class legal status will be acceptable to House Republicans.¶** GOP Rep. Eric Cantor, meanwhile, said this morning that he thinks Marco Rubio’s plan (which contains a path to citizenship, contingent on strict enforcement triggers) is “the right direction,” but he stopped short of endorsing that path. (Curiously, this comes on the same day that Cantor is set to give a speech “softening” the GOP’s image, something which has suffered in no small part from its immigration policies.)¶ There are two ways of looking at this. One is that **this could** end up **kill**ing **reform. The two critical pillars of reform are enforcement and a path to citizenship. Without both, the whole thing collapses. So by stopping short of accepting citizenship, House Republicans are putting immigration reform in jeopardy**, right?

**Gun control and budget thumps**

**Huffington Post, 2-7**, 13,

But let's get on with examining January and predicting the near future, shall we? Obama's trends for January are pretty flat. He didn't improve, he didn't lose much ground. But he did indeed hold onto where he was, which is impressive enough. Obama's five-month streak of increasing approval numbers raised his rating 5.9 percent since last July, and pushed him over 50 percent for the first time since his initial honeymoon period. If he continues polling steadily in the 51-55 percent range, Obama will gain back the 0.4 percent he lost this month (due again, largely, to one outlying poll).

 This might signal a return to the pre-election steadiness Obama managed throughout much of his first term. Good news or bad, Obama's poll numbers resisted much "spiking" one way or another and instead mostly followed gentle and steady curves, or spent long periods absolutely flat. **Obama** got significantly good news in January, from the fiscal cliff victory to the debt ceiling victory to a wonderful inauguration. He's **been using the "bully pulpit" with a vengeance, pushing his agenda on gun control,** comprehensive immigration reform, **and budget issues**, but none of this has moved his numbers above the bounce he got from the election.

**Panetta pushes, not Obama**

**Rosenkrantz 11** – (9/21/11, Ethan, legislative assistant to Rep. Lynn Woolsey, “Panetta-McKeon Stonewall; Obama Throws Smoke,” <http://pda-rdb.blogspot.com/2011/11/92111-rd-bulletin-panetta-mckeon.html> DH)

Executive: On Monday, President Obama outlined his **own** deficit reduction and job creation plan, which included recommendations for reforming TRICARE and addressing military retirement costs. The President also counted more than $1 trillion in savings from CBO baseline by winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Service chiefs, **led by Secretary Panetta**, fight against further cuts to the defense budget, as they acknowledge that the Defense Department will have to become smaller and leaner. **Sec. Panetta is preparing guidance for how the services can advocate to Congress against spending cuts.**

**SMRs have bipartisan support**

**Angwin 11** (Meredith Angwin, Former project manager at Electric Power Research Institute, Chemist, “Sanders The Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research,” 8/19/11) <http://theenergycollective.com/meredith-angwin/63331/sanders-sole-vote-against-small-modular-reactor-research>

 One of these measures was the Nuclear Power Act S512. This act would authorize the Secretary of Energy to start a cost-shared program for development of small modular reactors (SMRs).

This act had **strong bi-partisan support**, being sponsored by 3 Republican and 4 Democratic Senators. The act requires research and development funds for SMRs. The Act is still in process, and does not have a firm dollar amount attached, but the dollar amount is likely to be small (in government terms, at least.). Current estimates are $100 million per fiscal year for four years, starting next year.

The act also requires that industry cost-share the expense. If industry doesn't think it is worth spending money on the research, the research will not receive government funding either.

As a background to the probable cost of this Act, we should note that President Obama requested $4.8 billion dollars for Department of Energy research, of which $3.2 billion is allocated for renewable energy and energy efficiency research. (This number has changed with the debt deal, but new numbers are not available at this time.)

Small Modular Reactors for The Future

Sander's opposition to this Nuclear Power Act will hurt America's chances to develop an important new exportable technology. Outside of Europe, the nuclear renaissance remains in full swing, with reactors being ordered and built in Arabia, China, India and Southeast Asia. Developing a strong set of SMR designs would be America's best chance to re-entering the world market for nuclear power.

SMRs are modular (assembled in a factory and delivered to the site), small (50 to 225 MW) and have many safety features, such as passive cooling. SMRs are expected to have a huge international market. They suitable for many places that do not have the population density or money for the current crop of huge reactors (1200 MW, built on site at great expense). SMRs would make nuclear power affordable and salable many places.

Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox have invested significant amounts of their own money in developing these products. The NRC is also active in assessing preliminary designs. At another Senate committee meeting on SMRs, Commissioner Magwood of the NRC said that he does not expect decisions made by the NRC to be the critical factor in the success or failure of SMRs. Magwood noted that SMRs have passive safety features and large water inventories; these would be considered during license review.

America Fallen Behind

America has fallen far behind the rest of the world in most nuclear technologies. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) were developed in this country. They are being sold all over the world, but not by United States companies. We're out of the running. Other countries licensed and improved our original technologies. Companies from France, Korea, Russia and China compete to build large reactors in China, Arabia, and Southeast Asia.

Three American companies have put millions of dollars into the development of SMRs: Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and NuScale (a small start-up). Many people in the nuclear industry feel that the race to develop the first successful SMR is a truly high-stakes race, being fought at the level of nationwide efforts. Luckily, SMR development has bi-partisan support, and Mr. Sanders was **alone** in his opposition to supporting American industry efforts to develop these plants.

**Military energy is bipart**

**Davenport 12** (Coral Davenport, energy and environment correspondent for National Journal. Prior to joining National Journal in 2010, Davenport covered energy and environment for Politico, and before that, for Congressional Quarterly. In 2010, she was a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting, 2-10-12, “White House budget to expand clean energy programs through Pentagon,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-budget/white-house-budget-to-expand-clean-energy-programs-through-pentagon-20120210>)

The White House believes it has figured out how to get more money for clean-energy programs touted by President Obama without having it become political roadkill in the wake of the Solyndra controversy: **Put it in the Pentagon**.

While details are thin on the ground, lawmakers who work on both energy- and defense-spending policy believe the fiscal 2013 budget request to be delivered to Congress on Monday probably won’t include big increases for wind and solar power through the Energy Department, a major target for Republicans since solar-panel maker Solyndra defaulted last year on a $535 million loan guarantee.

But they do expect to see increases in spending on alternative energy in the Defense Department, such as programs to replace traditional jet fuel with biofuels, supply troops on the front lines with solar-powered electronic equipment, build hybrid-engine tanks and aircraft carriers, and increase renewable-energy use on military bases.

While Republicans will instantly shoot down requests for fresh spending on Energy Department programs that could be likened to the one that funded Solyndra, many support alternative-energy programs for the military.

“I do expect to see the spending,” said Rep. Jack Kingston, R-Ga., a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, when asked about increased investment in alternative-energy programs at the Pentagon. “I think in the past three to five years this has been going on, but that it has grown as a culture and a practice – and it’s a good thing.”

“If Israel attacks Iran, and we have to go to war – and the Straits of Hormuz are closed for a week or a month and the price of fuel is going to be high,” Kingston said, “the question is, in the military, what do you replace it with? It’s not something you just do for the ozone. It’s strategic.”

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who sits on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said, “I don’t see what they’re doing in DOD as being Solyndra.”

“We’re not talking about putting $500 million into a goofy idea,” Graham told National Journal. “We’re talking about taking applications of technologies that work and expanding them. I wouldn’t be for DOD having a bunch of money to play around with renewable technologies that have no hope. But from what I understand, there are renewables out there that already work.”

A senior House Democrat noted that this wouldn’t be the first time that the Pentagon has been utilized to advance policies that wouldn’t otherwise be supported.

“They did it in the ’90s with medical research,” said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

In 1993, when funding was frozen for breast-cancer research programs in the National Institutes of Health, Congress boosted the Pentagon’s budget for breast-cancer research – to more than double that of the health agency’s funding in that area.

Politically, the strategy makes sense. Republicans are ready to fire at the first sign of any pet Obama program, and renewable programs at the Energy Department are an exceptionally ripe target. That’s because of Solyndra, but also because, in the last two years, the Energy Department received a massive $40 billion infusion in funding for clean-energy programs from the stimulus law, a signature Obama policy. When that money runs out this year, a request for more on top of it would be met with flat-out derision from most congressional Republicans.

Increasing renewable-energy initiatives at the Pentagon can also help Obama advance his broader, national goals for transitioning the U.S. economy from fossil fuels to alternative sources. As the largest industrial consumer of energy in the world, the U.S. military can have a significant impact on energy markets – if it demands significant amounts of energy from alternative sources, it could help scale up production and ramp down prices for clean energy on the commercial market.

Obama acknowledged those impacts in a speech last month at the Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado. “The Navy is going to purchase enough clean-energy capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year. And it won’t cost taxpayers a dime,” Obama said.

“What does it mean? It means that the world’s largest consumer of energy – the Department of Defense – is making one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history,” the president added. “That will grow this market, it will strengthen our energy security.”

Experts also hope that Pentagon engagement in clean-energy technology could help yield breakthroughs with commercial applications.

Kingston acknowledged that the upfront costs for alternative fuels are higher than for conventional oil and gasoline. For example, the Air Force has pursued contracts to purchase biofuels made from algae and camelina, a grass-like plant, but those fuels can cost up to $150 a barrel, compared to oil, which is lately going for around $100 a barrel. Fuel-efficient hybrid tanks can cost $1 million more than conventional tanks – although in the long run they can help lessen the military’s oil dependence, Kingston said Republicans recognize that the up-front cost can yield a payoff later. “It wouldn’t be dead on arrival. But we’d need to see a two- to three-year payoff on the investment,” Kingston said.

Military officials – particularly Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, who has made alternative energy a cornerstone of his tenure – have been telling Congress for years that the military’s dependence on fossil fuels puts the troops – and the nation’s security – at risk.

Mabus has focused on meeting an ambitious mandate from a 2007 law to supply 25 percent of the military’s electricity from renewable power sources by 2025. (Obama has tried and failed to pass a similar national mandate.)

Last June, the DOD rolled out its first department-wide energy policy to coalesce alternative and energy-efficient initiatives across the military services. In January, the department announced that a study of military installations in the western United States found four California desert bases suitable to produce enough solar energy – 7,000 megawatts – to match seven nuclear power plants.

And so far, those moves have met with approval from congressional Republicans.

Even so, any request for new Pentagon spending will be met with greater scrutiny this year. The Pentagon’s budget is already under a microscope, due to $500 billion in automatic cuts to defense spending slated to take effect in 2013.

But even with those challenges, clean-energy spending probably won’t stand out as much in the military budget as it would in the Energy Department budget. Despite its name, the Energy Department has traditionally had little to do with energy policy – its chief portfolio is maintaining the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Without the stimulus money, last year only $1.9 billion of Energy’s $32 billion budget went to clean-energy programs. A spending increase of just $1 billion would make a big difference in the agency’s bottom line. But it would probably be easier to tuck another $1 billion or $2 billion on clean-energy spending into the Pentagon’s $518 billion budget. Last year, the Pentagon spent about $1 billion on renewable energy and energy-efficiency programs across its departments.

**Political capital doesn’t exist but winners-win and issues determine outcomes**

Michael **Hirsch, 2-7**, 13, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital,” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207> (Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994.)

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the **pundits will** do what they always do this time of year: They will **talk about how** unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital**” Obama possesses** to push his program through. **Most of this talk** will have no bearing on what actually happens **over the next four years. Consider this:** Three months ago**,** just before the November election, if someone had talked **seriously** about Obama having enough p**olitical** c**apital** to oversee **passage of both** immigration **reform** and gun-control **legislation at the beginning of his second term**—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy **and stripped of his pundit’s license**. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. **And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.** What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” **The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—**is so poorly defined that **presidents and pundits often** get it wrong**. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards**, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason**, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary.** It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do **about the ever-elusive concept of political power,** and **it** discounts **the way** unforeseen events **can suddenly change everything. Instead,** it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, **just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history**. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But **the abrupt emergence of the** immigration **and gun-control issues** illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists **who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies** say that p**olitical** c**apital** is, at best, an empty concept**, and that almost** nothing in the academic literature **successfully** quantifies or **even** defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. **That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University.** Even Ornstein concedes **that** the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue **often** changes the calculation for the next issue**; there is never any known amount of capital**. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” **Ornstein says. “**If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side**. It’s a bandwagon effect.”**

ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ

**Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s** **aggressive** and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not **that he didn’t have enough** political capital**.** Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. **The problem was that whatever** credibility **or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president** did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea **in most people’s eyes**. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” **Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea**,” as the party suffers in the polls.

THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. **Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging**, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well **lead to others. “Winning wins.”** Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because

2AC Impact Stuff – Economy

**The impact is an insurance industry hoax that ignores growth, technology and all other factors that check**

**Scrivener, ‘2** (P. Essayist, “The myth of the demographic time bomb”, http://www.sovereignty.org.uk/features/articles/demog2.html)

Why the pessimists are wrong

The pessimists use an arbitrary retirement age. British society has tended to accept the government's pension age or retirement age as the dividing line between active adulthood and old age, but when pensions were first introduced in Britain the retirement age was 70.

The compression of work into fewer years of longer hours does not fit well with increasing longevity, and there have been a number of authoritative calls from parliament and the actuarial profession against early retirement.

They assume that the present retirement age equates to the age at which elderly people become a burden. Commentators have taken the ratio of over 64-year olds to the population of working age (usually taken as the 16 to 64 age range) as the key trend in the rise in the elderly 'dependency' ratio. But continued improvements in living conditions make contemporary and future generations of the elderly fitter and healthier. And as across Europe and America healthcare costs are concentrated in the last six months of life, projections should be built up by counting back from the forecast date of death rather than from the date of birth.

They ignore economic growth. It is assumed that an ageing population will bankrupt the state pension scheme. However, the future rate of economic growth and the level of wealth creation determine affordability.

It is the types of jobs and technology, as well as the number of working people, that determine society's productivity. Modern societies double their wealth about every 25 years. This pace of expansion projected into the next half-century dwarfs the extra cost for society from more elderly dependants. In any case, industrialised societies are already productive enough to produce sufficient wealth to provide for the present elderly population, and even quite low levels of growth will satisfy even the most extreme projections of the future pace of ageing. (Indeed, using immigration to increase the labour force will depress wages, discourage investment in capital, slow the increase in productivity and decrease competitiveness -- as happened in England with the cotton industry.)

Because of increased wealth, Western societies have been able to manage a fall in the ratio of working people to retired people from 12:1 in 1900 to around 3:1 today.

They also ignore the possibility of encouraging changes in fertility. More influential on demographic ageing than increased longevity or the reduction of premature death, has been the fall in fertility rates. With each generation smaller than its predecessor the average age of the population rises. The proportion, and not necessarily the numbers, of old people rises.

Further declines in old age mortality will be much slower than over the past few decades. Then, if fertility were in the region of the replacement rate, population numbers and the age structure of the population would tend to stabilise. So, if society fears that there may be a problem with an ageing population (though this has been shown not to be the case), action could be taken now to encourage an increase in the birth rate to replacement levels.

The main cause of the decline in the fertility rate appears to be the increase in the numbers of working women, and the continuing inadequacy of proper childcare facilities discouraging pregnancy. Women tend to marry later and get pregnant later.

There are a number of actions that could be taken: taking one wage into account when calculating mortgages thus allowing one partner to stay at home to look after children; encouraging a more positive attitude towards family creation as the source of personal happiness and security and the basis of a stable society; the workplace, the tax and welfare system, such as increasing child benefit, could be made more favourable to women, so that they are able to have more than one child each.

Finally, the mythmakers use projections instead of forecasts. The official projections for Britain are that ageing will accelerate in the first third of the 21st century. Although these projections are widely used to back up the case for a demographic time bomb, a member of the Government Actuary's Department has written "the one certainty of making population projections is that these projections will, to a greater or lesser extent, turn out to be wrong as a forecast of future demographic behaviours".

**A projection based on the present state of affairs cannot forecast the future**, because present trends may not be maintained. Changes to fertility rates could significantly alter the situation. Even if all the projections are accurate, there will be a peak around 2040 in the proportion and numbers of over64s. Mullen tells us that the familiar steadily ascending lines on the charts used by alarmist commentators do not extend much beyond 2040. After this time, the proportion of over-64s declines.

No impact—last recession proves econ doesn’t determine conflict or instability

**Barnett 2009** – senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review (8/25, Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” World Politics Review, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>, WEA)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

So, to sum up:

No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?);

The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places);

Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered);

No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy);

A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and

No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis.

Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis?

Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed.

Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis?

If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism.

At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please!

Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon?

Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

**LA Escalation’s empirically denied—the region has survived hundreds of wars**

**Hartzell 2000** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

**CP 1AR**

**Private sector doesn’t solve military**

**Andres & Breetz 11** (Richard B. Andres is Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology. February 2011, “Small nuclear reactors for military installations: capabilities, costs, and technological implications,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.” 34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors.

It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD. 35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests. 36

On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs. 37

If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.

**Huge timeframe deficit**

**Marqusee 12** (Jeffrey Marqusee, Ph.D. from MIT in physical chemistry, Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Director of the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) at the DoD, March 2012, “Energy innovation at the Department of Defense: assessing the opportunities,” http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/Energy\_Innovation\_at\_DoD.pdf)

By contrast, emerging technologies offer the opportunity to cost-effectively reduce DoD’s facility energy demand by a dramatic amount (50 percent in existing buildings and 70 percent in new construction), and provide distributed generation and control technologies to improve energy security. Absent government involvement, however, these new and emerging technologies **will not be widely deployed in time for DoD to meet its energy goals and obligations**.

The key reason that DoD cannot passively rely on the private sector to provide a suite of new, cost-effective energy technologies is the difficulty of the transition from research and development to full deployment. Many have noted this challenge; it is often described as the “Valley of Death,” a term widely used in the early and mid-1990s to describe the obstacles to commercialization and deployment of environmental technologies. DoD’s environmental technology demonstration program, the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP), was created to overcome that hurdle.

**DoD says no**

**Lovins 10** (interview with Amory Lovins, physicist, environmental scientist, writer and Chairman/Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, has worked in the field of energy policy for four decades, has received ten honorary doctorates, provided expert testimony in 8 countries and briefed 19 heads of state, “Lovins addresses New Nuclear Power for DOD (Q&A 3 of 3)” 05/12/10,[http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/05/lovins-addresses-new-nuclear-power-for\_12.html](http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/05/lovins-addresses-new-nuclear-power-for_12.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Question 3: Are there any points in particular you'd like to call out re: the on nuclear energy generation potential for DOD? ABL: Yes. Two major technical task forces evaluating DoD's energy options have carefully considered the various nuclear technologies at diverse scales that were vigorously suggested to them. Both pointedly declined to recommend military pursuit of any nuclear technology to power facilities. My 1Q2010 Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) article "DoD's Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity" explains, with footnotes omitted: "Nuclear power is sometimes suggested for land installations or even expeditionary forces, typically without discussing cost (grossly uncompetitive), modern renewables (typically much cheaper), operational reliability (usually needing 100% backup), or security. For these and other reasons, the 2008 DSB and JASON task forces **didn’t endorse this option**."

Politics 1AR

Competitiveness is not a real thing

**Krugman,** Prof. of Economics @ MIT, **94**, Paul, March/April, *Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,* Foreign Affairs, Vol.73, Issue 2

How can this be in our interdependent world? Part of the answer is that the world is not as interdependent as you might think: **countries are nothing at all like corporations**. Even today; U.S. exports are only 10 percent of the value-added in the economy (which is equal to GNP). That is, the United States is still almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods and services for its own use. By contrast, even the largest corporation sells hardly any of its output to its own workers; the "exports" of General Motors--its sales to people who do not work there--are virtually all of its sales, which are more than 2.5 times the corporation's value-added. Moreover, countries do not compete with each other the way corporations do. Coke and Pepsi are almost purely rivals: only a negligible fraction of Coca-Cola's sales go to Pepsi workers, only a negligible fraction of the goods Coca-Cola workers buy are Pepsi products. So if Pepsi is successful, it tends to be at Coke's expense. **But the major industrial countries**, while they sell products that compete with each other, **are also each other's main export markets and each other's main suppliers of useful imports**. If the European economy does well, it need not be at U.S. expense; indeed, if anything a successful European economy is likely to help the U.S. economy by providing it with larger markets and selling it goods of superior quality at lower prices. **International trade**, then, **is not a zero-sum game**. When productivity rises in Japan, the main result is a rise in Japanese real wages; American or European wages are in principle at least as likely to rise as to fall, and in practice seem to be virtually unaffected.

#### Be skeptical – Immigration reform is always brought up and put to the side

Nowicki 2-9 (Dan, "The art of the deal on immigration reform," AZCentral, www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130201immigration-reform-deal.html)

In favor of comprehensive immigration reform: After years of indifference and, more recently, partisan bickering, both parties appear motivated to do something. The last major congressional overhaul of the system was in 1986, during President Ronald Reagan’s administration. Senate immigration-reform efforts in 2006 and 2007 did not result in new laws. Reform advocates also were disappointed at the lack of progress during Obama’s first term, but are hopeful that the issue may finally be reaching critical mass.¶ “It’s rare to find something that is so continually brought up and put to the side, and brought up and put to the side, as immigration reform,” said Kareem Crayton, a political scientist and associate professor of law at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. “We may be at the breaking point.”

#### The House is key – throw out any card about the senate – its not responsive

Demirjian 2-1 (Karoun, "Immigration reform may be tougher sell with House Republican," Las Vegas Sun, www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/feb/01/immigration-reform-may-be-tougher-sell-house-repub/)

Next week, the House of Representatives turns its attention to the revived issue of immigration reform with a hearing in its Judiciary Committee, the chairman of which considers the proposed pathway to citizenship to be “amnesty.”¶ “No one should be surprised that individuals who have supported amnesty in the past still support amnesty,” Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas, said in a statement. “When you legalize those who are in the country illegally, it costs taxpayers millions of dollars, costs American workers thousands of jobs and encourages more illegal immigration.”¶ Smith does not speak for all House Republicans, much like Sens. Marco Rubio, John McCain, Jeff Flake and Lindsey Graham — the four Republicans participating in the bipartisan Senate group crafting a comprehensive bill — do not speak for all Republicans in the Senate.¶ But House Republicans have not kept pace with the Senate Republicans’ evolving position on immigration reform — not nationwide or in Nevada.¶ “The House is a different animal, and the dynamics are different there,” said UNLV political science professor David Damore. “Once this goes to the House, it’s just going to slow down.”¶ Immigration has never been a cleanly Republican-vs.-Democrat issue. But the growth of the Hispanic electorate and the disappearance of moderate Democrats from Congress has helped polarize the political dynamics of immigration since the last time this issue was up for consideration in 2007.¶ The result is that Democrats, by and large, have inherited the reputation as the party that is friendly toward immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, while Republicans are seen as more exclusive in their approach, favoring stepped-up enforcement over expansion of the existing immigration laws.¶ But Senate Republicans are moving faster than they are in the House to declare themselves champions of the middle ground.¶ Take Nevada Sen. Dean Heller, for example: The last time there was a concerted congressional effort on immigration, Heller, then barely off his first election to Congress as the representative for the 2nd District, was talking about the evils of legalizing the status of undocumented immigrants.¶ Today, he’s declared himself to be firmly in favor of a pathway to citizenship for at least the younger, college-enrolled and military-enlisted immigrants who came to the U.S. as children — something that until recently, only the Democrats of the Nevada delegation supported.¶ In the House, however, neither Nevada Rep. Joe Heck, who represents the 3rd District, nor Nevada Rep. Mark Amodei, who represents the 2nd, has moved as far to the center.¶ “A lot of it is explained by constituency dynamics,” said UNR political science professor Eric Herzik. “The safe spot in CD2 has always been ‘build a fence, and if that’s not enough, electrify it.’ So I don’t think you’re going to get a lot of movement from Amodei.”¶ Amodei’s district, the one Heller used to represent, has a more conservative and less ethnically diverse constituency than the state as a whole.¶ Those constituent breakdowns are important to note when considering lawmakers and their positions on the issues.¶ At the polls, Democrats have steadily been gaining favor among Hispanic voters — a population with large immigrant representation — since former President George W. Bush’s administration.¶ Republicans — especially in states with large Hispanic populations, such as Nevada — have noted the losses. But in the districts where Hispanics are not as numerous, the message reverberated less strongly.¶ “A Democrat is not going to take out Mark Amodei." Herzik said. "The only person that’s going to take out Mark Amodei is Mark Amodei, or a challenge from the right.¶ “But Heck is a harder one to understand. In a district like CD3, that is a prescription to lose. So it will be interesting to see how Heck evolves on this.”¶ Heck’s district has a more evenly split political profile and a larger Hispanic population — it’s more than 30 percent of his district.¶ Yet, he has not moved as Heller has to embrace the immigration position most of those Hispanic constituents endorse.¶ “What we literally have right now is a speech and a framework,” Heck’s spokesman Greg Lemon said Wednesday. “Let’s see what the bill is going to look like.”¶ Lemon added that Heck has spoken in favor of border security and employer verification and against amnesty in his time as a congressman. All are safe positions within the Republican Party.¶ “Heck’s trying to figure out not only his district ... he also has to deal with his other colleagues in order to get anything done,” Herzik said. “And right now in the House, he’s got 80 Tea Party members who will not even talk about immigration reform ... so how much grief will he catch within his caucus?”¶ But part of the reason he has not had to go further is that the House is not likely to move before the Senate has completed its work.¶ In the House, there is a group of lawmakers who, much like the group of senators who put out their framework Monday, are working to hash out a mutually agreeable framework on immigration reform.¶ “The reality is, to fix the system, we have to pass legislation, and the only way we can pass legislation is if it is bipartisan,” said Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, one of the Republicans in the House’s immigration working group.¶ Diaz-Balart likes the look of the Senate’s framework and expects the House to rally 218 votes around a similar proposal because “reasonable people who want to solve this are going to reach relatively similar conclusions.”¶ But House negotiators have made less progress than counterparts in the Senate. According to various reports, the House group might not have a proposal until the State of the Union speech Feb. 12. Senators had expected to finish turning this week’s framework into a piece of legislation within just a few weeks of that date, then work through the spring to pass the bill.¶ But even if the Senate successfully passes an immigration compromise, it faces a much harder road in the House.